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abstract
In this paper, we review the various types of epistemic usages of the (simple and
anterior) future tenses in French with the assumption that what actually licenses
their occurrence is not a semantic feature such as aspect but pragmatic effects that
give relevance to the utterance at the moment of speech. We review the main
hypotheses proposed in the relevant literature and conclude that epistemic futures
seem to fulfill the function of communicating – through a metarepresentation
of a future verification – not only epistemic modality and evidentiality, but
also, and perhaps especially, the inference that a particular course of action has
to be undertaken from the perspective of a state of affairs that is true in the
present.
1 . introduction 1
The aim of this paper is to investigate the manifestation of a (subjective) epistemic2
attitude by means of morphemes that denote a future temporal quantification of
the eventuality in French, as in Ce sera le facteur uttered just after the bell has rung.
French scholars also refer to this usage of the future tense as the ‘putative future’
( futur putatif, Damourette et Pichon, 1911–1936) or the ‘conjectural future’ ( future
conjectural, Wilmet, 1976), and usually distinguish it from other types of epistemic
utterances with the future tense because of its particular flavour of probability. In
English, similar cases are documented with will, often under the label of ‘assumptive
will’ (Thomson and Martinet, 1996, Declerck, 1991 and 2006, Palmer, 2001), and
with gonna (in contrast to going to which is controversial in this respect, see Celle,
2004 vs. Declerck, 2006: 350). Will has – like its equivalents in other Germanic
languages – both temporal and epistemic meanings (it’s usual to consider that there
is always an element of epistemic modality in the meaning of will as a residue
1 The authors would like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation, who funded our
research on non-descriptive uses of temporal expressions (project N◦100012–120299/1)
and the three anonymous referees whose comments and advice helped improve the quality
of this paper.
2 Expressing abstract possibility (Palmer, 2001; Lyons, 1977); henceforth ‘epistemic’.
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of its diachronic origin). A close conceptual link between futurity and epistemic
modality is a classical assumption of several semantic approaches, which consider
that since the future is by nature uncertain, it follows that any utterance denoting
a future eventuality bears an intrinsic epistemic modality, expressing only possible
eventualities.3 On the contrary, our view is that one should not confuse inherent
properties of real-world phenomena such as temporality (or what we think of
temporality as such) with the fact that individuals can – and do – communicate
(and understand) representations that are relatively independent of these ontological
characteristics. In McKim and Davis’s (1976: 233) words, “[it is] difficult to believe
that metaphysical assumptions about determinism and indeterminism could have
any direct bearing on the semantic interpretation of future-tensed statements”.
Thus, the future tense allows us to make a description of an event, outside of
any evocation of a belief or attitude, in much the same way as the present or past
tenses, despite the clear metaphysical asymmetry between the past and the future;
in this case one describes an event, deemed certain or known in the future (i.e.
a prediction presented as certain). This does not in any way prevent the intuitive
fact that natural or ontological properties of the future may also be used in other
situations, whereby one can make manifest, through the use of the future tense,
that what is said is not the representation of a truth with a future time index, but
rather a speculation about the future, the present or the past (epistemic readings).
We argue that an epistemic reading of future tense utterances is triggered by a
cognitive process of pragmatic accommodation.
We adopt the view that tenses encode instructions on how the eventuality
is to be represented by the hearer through the position of temporal coordinates
(Reichenbach’s 1980 [1947] Speech time (S), Event time (E) and Reference time
(R) points)4 in the mental conceptualization of time, intervals of validity, and, in
some cases, perspective-switching (as when the French imparfait needs contextual
accommodation in order to express free indirect speech and other non-standard
meanings).5
Though the future tense(s) express(es) futurity, even by means of instructions
and not through the activation of some concept of ‘future’, it may still be the case
3 The idea that the (formal) semantics of the future bears an intrinsic epistemic modality
goes back at least to McArthur (1974).
4 Reichenbach (1947) is usually considered as having established the basis for the semantics
of tense as combinations of coordinates on the Time line. S stands for speech point and
designates the time of the utterance (the deictic present). E stands for point of the event
and designates the point or span of time at which the eventuality holds. R stands for point
of reference and designates the time from which the eventuality is considered. Although
Reichenbach’s model was amended and supplemented in various ways since then, the S,
E and R coordinates themselves remain the standard notation.
5 For the conception of tenses as procedural expressions in the Sperber and Wilson tradition,
see Nicolle (1997) and Saussure (2003). For a detailed account of point-of-view switching
with the French Imparfait, see Saussure and Sthioul (1999 and 2005).
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that futurity conveys epistemic modality; it would follow that all future sentences
express epistemic modality in some way. This is well-suited to utterances with
a future tense expressing possibility or probability in the future, and might form
the basis for explaining utterances with a future tense expressing possibility or
probability in the present, which is the focus of this article. But then, obviously,
all future utterances would be redundant with an epistemic marker, at least in part:
in this case the marker’s only role would be to specify a degree on the epistemic
scale; furthermore, a future tense should be incompatible with a modal marker of
certainty if that marker has scope over the proposition itself (and not over the modal
value).
We quite classically take modal markers to be operators having scope over a
proposition which they modify. A marker of epistemic modality can be explicit
(this is the case with may and adverbs such as maybe and probably, in French peut-eˆtre
or probablement). Often, however, it is difficult to assess whether a marker is explicitly
epistemic or if the epistemic interpretation stems from contextual accommodation;
this is the case with must and devoir, which both have root and epistemic readings
that depend on contextual factors. The same also holds with French pouvoir, which
has both root and epistemic readings. Epistemic modality can also be conveyed
implicitly, that is, via an accommodation of the whole utterance to the context.
This happens if a non-epistemic reading causes an inconsistency with the current
context. We suggest that this typically happens in epistemic readings triggered by the
future tense in contexts where the eventuality cannot be interpreted as happening
in the future. In a case like (1), below, the modal marker is not discernible and the
epistemic reading is only available if it is mutually manifest to the interlocutors that
the doorbell just rang and that there is no absolute certainty about who just rang it
(typically there is no visual perception of that person):
(1) [On sonne a` la porte.] Ce sera le facteur.
Here the speaker uses a future tense to refer to a probable eventuality in the
present (it is the postman who just rang the bell), thereby displacing the focus
of a future event into the present (or conversely, projecting him/herself from the
present into the future). The observable effect here is that the hearer understands
the speaker’s utterance as a probability calculation, thus resolving the inconsistency
of the speaker manifesting an assumption about the future when it’s obviously about
the present.
The aim of this paper is to provide a pragmatic account of such usages of the
future tense. Our general assumption follows the classical analysis in which the
epistemic future in French represents a future verification of a possible state of
affairs in the present (or in the past, as with the anterior future); we insist that it
does not necessarily express a possible explanation of a perceived state of affairs, as
is sometimes suggested. We posit that the representation of a future verification is
an allocentric representation, that is, a representation attributed to an utterer other
than the Speaker at the time of speech (hence representing a third party’s point of
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view)6 and, as such, it is efficiently analysed as an ‘interpretive use’ of the tense in
the sense of Sperber and Wilson (1995), i.e. a case where what is represented by the
utterance is not a fact but an allocentric thought about a fact. Finally, we suggest
that the epistemic future in French, as a non-standard way of expressing epistemic
modality, bears specific relevance in the present of speech, in the sense of inviting a
particular course of action in the expectation of the future certainty of the situation
considered. When such relevance in the present is not available, then an epistemic
modality cannot be derived from the future tense.
2 the e p i stemic future in french: data and analys i s
2.1 Background and hypotheses
We will discuss the hypothesis that what is understood via an epistemic future
utterance is not a future situation but a future time when the situation can be
verified. This assumption was suggested by various authors and can be considered
consensual (Wilmet, 1976, Martin, 1987, Vetters, 1995, Vetters and Skibinska, 1998;
see also Bellahse`ne, 2007). It was developed in relevance-theoretic terms by Sthioul
(1998) who formulates it as an interpretive usage of the future: these utterances,
he explains, refer to the eventuality by means of an imaginary allocentric point of
consciousness in the future, from which the truth of the eventuality can be verified
and therefore assessed as a fact. In his words:
Le futur putatif appre´hende une situation pre´sente par le biais de l’explication qui en sera
selon toute probabilite´ donne´e quelques instants plus tard: l’e´nonce´ rend ainsi compte
d’une connaissance attribue´e a` une instance connaissant la situation, instance que le
locuteur pre´sente comme e´tant distincte de lui-meˆme parce qu’il n’est pas en mesure
de poser une affirmation avec certitude. (Sthioul, 1998: 206).
This assumption will be the starting point for our demonstration. The imaginary
or actual verification that is described in the future stems from the (future) perspective
of an allocentric third party. In other words, the epistemic future stems from a
represented thought. However, we will also see that this explanation, in turn, raises
problems. In particular, we will show that the epistemic future does not necessarily
represent an actual verification of a possible explanation for a present state of affairs.
The last point to be addressed here is the very nature of the epistemic
representation raised by the future tense in these utterances. When epistemic
attitudes are about verifiable facts in the world, they are, according to Lyons (1977),
objective-epistemic: that P is possible is not only the speaker’s belief but a proposition
subject to truth-evaluation and can be questioned or evaluated by the interlocutor
(therefore utterances like It is false that this dog may beat you are not odd). If the
6 The term allocentric is used in psychology when referring to the opposite of egocentricity. It is
common in French linguistic traditions at least since the work of Damourette and Pichon
(1911–1936), who typically use it when dealing with those uses of tenses that activate third
party viewpoints such as free indirect speech with the imparfait.
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epistemic future in French is about verification, one could then expect that it is
objective-epistemic. But if the verification is only envisaged in a different possible
world, then the actual possibilities of verification in the egocentric world are not
fulfilled; this would entail that the epistemic future falls within the category of
subjective-epistemic utterances in Lyons’ terms. Such utterances manifest epistemic
attitudes as a matter of course, which are by nature mental states and thus cannot
be questioned, since they are ‘externally inscrutable’ (Papafragou, 2006). A number
of expressions of epistemic beliefs allow only for expressing these mental states.7
Typical examples of these are epistemic must in English and peut-eˆtre in French: one
cannot comment on one of these ‘must’-utterances in terms of truth or falsity (∗It’s
false that Paul must be at the swimming pool and ∗C’est faux que Pierre est peut-eˆtre a` la
piscine, see Papafragou, 2006 and van der Auwera, 2003). In this respect, the French
epistemic future seems indeed to behave like a subjective-epistemic utterance:
(2) ∗Il est faux que ce sera le facteur (subjective-epistemic reading).
That epistemic future utterances in French are subjective-epistemic is in accordance
with the hypothesis that it expresses (among other contents) verifiability in the
future by an allocentric third party. If we consider that epistemic enrichment can
be a natural cognitive enrichment based on futurity,8 then a number of predictions
can be made. First, the epistemic future should be available for any verifiable
eventuality in the future. This implies that it should be natural with any state of
affairs that is expected to continue for a relevant time (thus states and activities)
but not with achievements,9 unless there is semantic or pragmatic access to the
representation of a resultant state. Also, if it is true that the pragmatic enrichment
is not procedurally triggered by the tense as a linguistic expression but rather by
the futurity itself, then epistemic readings should be available with other future
tenses, possibly with restrictions due to the specific properties of these tenses. We
will check these predictions on the various future tenses available in French.
Let us now turn to the question of how the epistemic future functions in French.
We will examine the main characteristics and restrictions imposed by linguistic and
contextual factors; we will then look at the differences and similarities of these
usages as between the simple, anterior and periphrastic futures. The hypothesis of
future verifiability, since the verification is envisaged in terms of an allocentric point
of view, does not entail actual verification. This last point is slightly tricky and may
lead to unwarranted speculation on what is and what is not verifiable if verification
were impossible but still remain a representational effect of the epistemic future.
We will turn to this point further in the course of our discussion below.
7 Which does not necessarily make these utterances non-truth-conditional: see Papafragou
(2006).
8 This in no way entails that all future utterances are epistemic. Modality, we suggest, is just
a natural but optional pragmatic enrichment based on futurity.
9 ‘Achievements’ are those eventualities which have no temporal extension (they occur
instantaneously), such as reach the finish line, find one’s keys, etc. They do not license
temporal modifiers denoting duration (e.g. for 10 minutes).
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2.2 The simple future
The usual assumptions, endorsed for example by Celle (2004:187), are i) that the
epistemic usage of the simple future in French is only possible with eˆtre and avoir,
ii) that this usage is impossible with 1st and 2nd person subjects and iii) that it
is rare in contemporary French (see Le Querler, 1996, Tasmowsky and Dendale,
1998 and Rocci, 2000: 244–245). We claim that these assumptions are too strong.
We won’t discuss here the alleged rarity (which is, incidentally, not a criterion for
naturalness), which is contrary to our impressions.10
If we are to consider data through the lens of pragmatics, then first of all, we
suggest that if it seems difficult to have a (deictic) personal pronoun with these
usages, this is due to the lack of relevance involved in evoking a situation that is
manifest to the speaker as ‘modal’ with a marker which is modally ambiguous:
(3) a – Qu’est-ce que tu fais?
b – ? Je mangerai une pomme.11
(4) a – Ou` est-tu en ce moment?
b – ? Je serai chez moi.
The oddness is due, we claim, not to grammatical or semantic factors but to purely
pragmatic ones: it is pragmatically nonsensical that the speaker should epistemically
evaluate the state of affairs about which s/he is uncertain, except in very special
cases.12 Explicit modals are similarly unexpected if the situation is obviously true:
Je mange probablement une pomme is odd unless the Speaker is blindfolded and must
guess what s/he is eating. The explanation for why Je mangerai une pomme, on its
own, is even more difficult than je mange peut-eˆtre une pomme comes from the fact
that epistemic modality must be inferred in the first case through the inconsistency
of a future temporal reference with the speech situation, whereas modality is
explicitly communicated via peut-eˆtre. An explicit modal marker such as peut-eˆtre
or may, unambiguously forcing the epistemic reading, gives access to a context
where the speaker doesn’t actually know what s/he is eating.13 We suggest that
10 Some popular texts such as the Tintin comic strips, obviously understandable without
question by all speakers of French, show a great number of epistemic futures (actually,
mostly anterior futures). If Tintin can be suspected to have been written in an archaic or
regional version of French, this only indicates that epistemic futures are available in that
area, not that it is restricted to that area ( cf. Vetters and Skibinska, 1998, an idea which we
reject). We have no doubt that a systematic corpus study, still to be pursued, would prove
the epistemic future in French to be much more widespread than is often thought, even in
spontaneous oral communication, except in some areas (it seems less popular in Parisian
French for example). We quote below only a few authentic examples, but the authors
have noticed a significant number of occurrences throughout various French-speaking
areas; at least, epistemic futures are alive and well in central France, in Switzerland and in
Belgium, in particular in the anterior future form (see also Dendale, 2001).
11 We use the question mark to refer to pragmatic oddness.
12 An analysis also suggested by Schrott (1997).
13 This is a scalar inference triggered for reasons of relevance (or as an outcome of the
Gricean maxim of quantity): the possibility of a state of affairs known to be true is itself
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(3b) is strange because there is no accessible context in which one doesn’t know
what one is eating; however, perhaps (3b) is possible in the case of a guessing
game, though in a register that is unusual for an oral conversation. The case of
(4b) is similar: within a particular context – for instance that it is plausible or
manifest that the Speaker does not know where s/he is or what s/he is doing –
s/he must infer their state and thus communicate the uncertain nature of their
own inference to the hearer. He or she will then find this modal enrichment
relevant, provided that future verification is accessible, as we will demonstrate
below in more detail. It is therefore the rarity of the situation, or the difficulty
in accessing such a context, that gives the impression of oddness in these cases.
‘I may/could be at home’ seems to automatically communicate that the Speaker
is uncertain,14 since the modality is explicit. But the fact that one must admit
an unlikely or difficult context (e.g., the Speaker was kidnapped, then returned
home blindfolded – improbable events, indeed, but pragmatically improbable events,
all the more so when s/he is calmly communicating with an epistemic future) is
a superficial problem. But whenever there is certain contextual evidence for the
uncertain nature of the situation denoted, the modal reading of the future tense
is accessible, even in the 1st person (5b) and of course in the 2nd person as well
(6) or the 1st person plural (7b) – even if these readings may require an effort of
contextualisation if envisaged abstractly:
(5) a – Tu n’es pas bien?
b – J’aurai une petite grippe, voila` tout.
(6) Tu auras une petite grippe, voila` tout.
(7) a – Que se passe-t-il?
b - Nous serons dans une zone de turbulences, voila` tout.
With vous as well, epistemic future usage is reputed odd, but it remains easy enough
to see that occurrences like (8) (in the anterior future tense) or (9) (in the simple
future tense) are perfectly natural to a native speaker’s ear with the epistemic
meaning:
(8) Vous aurez mal ferme´ la porte.
(9) Tu seras son bouc e´missaire dans cette affaire.
Now, what about verbs other than eˆtre and avoir? Once again, we can see that the
prohibition postulated by most of the literature is much too strong, as the following
examples show: here, predicates denoting activities (contrary to what the literature
generally assumes) and states combine without difficulty with the simple future in
an epistemic reading:
true, but one doesn’t pragmatically access the truth when mere possibility is expressed. It
is noteworthy that when a doubt becomes pragmatically more accessible, the utterance
becomes more compatible with the epistemic future with je, as with ‘Je me serai (donc)
trompe´!’ (anterior future) as it is with other less explicit modal forms as well (as with J’ai
duˆ me tromper mentioned by an anonymous referee).
14 Except, of course, if in a guessing game.
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(10) Son train traversera un tunnel [c’est pourquoi son te´le´phone mobile est
inatteignable]. (Sthioul, 2007:118).
(11) Elle prendra son bain [c’est pour c¸a qu’elle ne re´pond pas au te´le´phone].
(12) Il dormira [c’est pour c¸a qu’il ne re´pond pas au te´le´phone].
Bellahse`ne (2007: 254, n.4) notes a similar example presented by Chevalier
et al. (1978: 352): Notre ami est absent. Il pre´sidera quelque re´union. Notice that
although (10), (11) and (12) are indeed natural, a progressive form would
be predicted as preferred by the hypothesis of ‘future verification’, since the
progressive explicitly entails the continuation of the eventuality, while with a
simple future, the continuity has to be inferred if the predicates are not stative.
Since progressive forms with activities are more natural than non-progressive forms
when communicating that the eventuality is still taking place, predictably a native
French speaker will find (13), (14) and (15) even more natural than the above
examples:
(13) Son train sera en train de traverser un tunnel.
(14) Elle sera en train de prendre son bain.
(15) Il sera en train de dormir.
Another kind of facilitation is provided by passivisation. Contrasting (16) and (17),
both clearly possible in French, we note that (17) gives easier access to an epistemic
context of interpretation. The reason for this is, we suggest, that the passive form
triggers an effect of non-boundedness and therefore better allows for an inference
of permanence; this makes an example like (17) very similar to examples with the
anterior future (see below); however this point calls for a complex development
which we cannot undertake here:
(16) Des solliciteurs le retiendront a` son bureau.
(17) Il sera retenu a` son bureau par des solliciteurs.
The ‘future verification’ hypothesis allows for the prediction that stative predicates
should work perfectly with epistemic readings with the future tense, given an
appropriate context, since they naturally trigger the inference of their permanence
in some future without further computation (stative predicates, obviously, are atelic
and thus don’t trigger the inference of a result). We will see that, again, examples
that seem odd with statives are so for purely pragmatic reasons. This is the case with
(18), which might seem odd at first sight:
(18) ? Il connaıˆtra Pierre [epistemic reading].
But as soon as there is some relevance in the speech situation that the individual
in question might know Pierre, an example like (18) does in fact become natural.
Examples (19) and (20), where we spell out the contextual conditions for such
relevance, are all the easier to interpret, as Pierre’s relevant ability is made
explicit:
(19) a – J’ai une fuite dans ma salle de bains.
b – Demande a` Pierre, il connaıˆtra un plombier!
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(20) a – J’ai un proble`me avec cette question.
b – Demande a` Pierre, il connaıˆtra la solution!15
On the other hand, it should also be a consequence of ‘future verifiability’ that
epistemic readings in future tense utterances cannot occur with achievements, since
by definition, achievements have no permanence. The following examples confirm
this hypothesis:
(21) ∗La bombe explosera [in the epistemic reading].
(22) ∗Max atteindra le sommet [in the epistemic reading].
However, achievements are possible if rephrased either in the anterior future or via
a cleft construction with eˆtre. The anterior future, as a perfect, denotes a resultant
state, which can be represented as persisting in the allocentric future of verification,
which readily allows the epistemic reading as in (23) below. But then, the assumption
is about a past eventuality (the summit has necessarily been reached at the time of
speech), not a present one:
(23) Max aura atteint le sommet.
The case of the cleft construction, as in (24), which is more difficult to explain,
adds elements supporting the hypothesis of an allocentric reading:
(24) Ce sera la bombe qui explose.
We suggest that (24) is interpreted as a represented thought or utterance, i.e., as
an allocentric metarepresentation: a typical completion of such constructions is
. . . tu verras. Why? Our hypothesis is that eˆtre requires one to mentally access a state,
not an event; here, the state inferred in the verifiable future is the resultant state of
an explosion, which, once observed, can allow the backward inference that ‘it was
a bomb’ that caused the observable state.
15 An anonymous referee suggests that (19b) and (20b) trigger hypothetical readings
(equivalent to Si tu demandes a` Pierre, il connaıˆtra la solution) instead of an epistemic
one. We think the hypothetical condition is not what is expressed by these utterances,
but more importantly, we suggest that even if it were the case, it would not in any way
change the epistemic reading of the future clause. The only other option would be that
the future clause expresses a description of a future state of affairs, which cannot be the
case, since the only available ‘hypothetical’ reading of these examples is metalinguistic
(the fact of asking Pierre cannot entail his knowing a plumber). In turn, if metalinguistic,
then the second clause expresses an illocutionary force other than assertion, in this case an
epistemic modality. In all plausible interpretations, here we obtain not a mere prediction
expressing certainty (as with il te donnera le nume´ro de son plombier dont il est si content) but
a (high) probability. The referee rightly observes that the degree of certainty expressed
in this use seems higher that probability, with which we might agree, but we insist that
(19b) and (20b) don’t express certainty (even if equivalent to Je suis suˆr que P, as the referee
suggests, since je suis suˆr que, despite semantic appearances, doesn’t entail certainty). The
epistemic reading of these examples is even clearer when the clause is modified with bien,
which lowers the epistemic degree of commitment: Demande a` Pierre, il connaıˆtra bien un
plombier, which is equivalent neither to a si-clause nor to certainty. For more on degrees
of certainty see Morency (2010: 202–205).
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2.3 The anterior future
With the epistemic anterior future, the Speaker expresses an explanation inferred
from a resultant state, true at the time of speech, but triggered by an eventuality
understood as occurring in the past. In other words, the modality here has scope
over a past eventuality based on the observation of a fact true at the time of speech
S. Still, both the eventuality and the resultant state are represented as verified at a
future time:
(25) [Paul is late] Il aura manque´ son train.
(26) [The Speaker failed to reach his correspondent by phone] Il aura traverse´ un
tunnel.
Note that there is more flexibility than is generally admitted in epistemic usages,
namely in the 1st and 2nd persons once again; similarly, the aspectual constraints
seem much weaker than expected. In our view, this is clearly because the verbs avoir
and eˆtre cancel the aspectual limitations through the representation of a resultant
state epistemically represented at the time of speech (having missed the train or
having been in a tunnel, will trivially remain true at the represented future time of
verification if they are true at S).
In relation to the use of I or you, it is not surprising that the memory of a
past event does not have the same knowledge status that a situation perceivable at
the time of utterance has; hence the naturalness of epistemic anterior futures with
(deictic) personal pronouns, compared to the sophisticated contexts it is necessary
to have in order to find accessible cases for the simple epistemic future in a similar
situation:
(27) Je me serai fait piquer par un insecte.
(28) Tu te seras fait piquer par un insecte.
It is thus, as we proposed earlier, essentially a question of the manifestness of the
relevant facts that pragmatically come into play to render such utterances acceptable.
This, again, shows how much the semantic constraints are far less crucial than
the cognitive, representational, ones, when it comes to licensing the epistemic
interpretations of future tense utterances.
2.4 The periphrastic future
What the French grammarians Damourette et Pichon (1911–1936: 279–282) said of
the periphrastic future (PFUT) in French remains the usual, and we think, correct,
way of describing it: the periphrastic future communicates that the conditions for
the future eventuality’s occurrence are met in the present (hence a mother saying
to her child, upon leaving for an appointment: Tu joueras encore (‘you play-FUT
again’), meaning ‘you will play again (when we come back)’ and not Tu vas encore
jouer (PFUT), meaning ‘you will still play (now)’). It is then expectable that the
epistemic effect, which calls for the present situation to continue into the future of
verification, is also possible with the PFUT. This prediction is correct:
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(29) C¸a va eˆtre le facteur [the doorbell just rang].
(29) typically receives an epistemic interpretation; though the simple future may
not be very frequent with an epistemic reading, our intuition is that periphrastic
futures with epistemic readings are very common in contemporary informal oral
communication, just as the periphrastic future tends to be more closely connected
with oral communication than the simple future.
However, we note the increased difficulty for non-stative verbs to allow epistemic
readings with the PFUT (but verbs other than eˆtre or avoir are clearly possible, as in
Demande a` Pierre, il va savoir la re´ponse):
(30) Marie va prendre son bain [∗epistemic reading].
(31) Son train va traverser un tunnel [∗epistemic reading].
The periphrastic future imposes a reading where the preparatory conditions are
fulfilled in the present (probably because of the present tense of the auxiliary, and
perhaps because of some residue of the primary meaning of aller. In (29), the typical
interpretation is that of an allocentric subject (possibly the speaker herself) proving
the egocentric speaker right in the near future by a representation of the form ‘it
really is the postman that just rang’. More precisely, the typical interpretation is that
‘it is going to be the postman in front of me when I open the door in a minute’.
A reading of this kind is unavailable without eˆtre, and, as a consequence, epistemic
readings are allowed with progressive utterances like (32) or (33), as one would
expect:
(32) A l’heure qu’il est, Marie va eˆtre en train de regarder la te´le´, pas de soucis.
(33) Son train va eˆtre en train de traverser un tunnel.
3 e p i stemic future s bearing causal-explanatory re levance
to the pre sent of spe ech
We posited that epistemic futures are interpreted as metarepresentations of a real
or imaginary future verification of the eventuality denoted or resultant state,
following Sthioul (1998). By proposing examples for which an actual verification
is conceivable and contrasting them with examples where such verification seems
intrinsically impossible, we might think we have obtained an indication of this
verification criterion, namely that the interpretation of an epistemic future projects
a future allocentric subject16 who knows the situation. The following examples,
which represent situations that cannot conceivably be verified in any future, indeed
seem odd (although we will later qualify their oddness and explain it in terms of
purely pragmatic factors):
(34) ? L’univers sera sphe´rique [epistemic reading].
(35) ? Dieu sera indulgent avec lui [epistemic reading].
16 An enunciator distinct from the speaker at S. See footnote 6 on allocentricity.
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(34) and (35) represent situations that cannot be verified in any conceivable future.17
These examples present a real puzzle, which we will try to address now. First of all,
we note, following Rocci,18 that there are indeed examples such as (36) in which
no verification in the future is conceivable but which are at the same time perfectly
natural as epistemic futures:
(36) Il sera mort en pensant a` sa femme.
We briefly mentioned that what we mean by future verifiability does not inhibit
the factual, concrete, actual verifiability of the events in play. In (36), the Speaker
projects a future consciousness which knows the thoughts of the deceased; and
this is perfectly acceptable since human representation is not limited by ontological
reality. So we will seek a different explanation for the apparent oddness of (34) and
(35).
The staging of an imaginary consciousness in the future capable of actually
verifying the fact is for us a hypothesis to be articulated with the hypothesis of
the epistemic future as an interpretive usage of the tense, that is, an interpretation
of a situation represented as being observed from a different viewpoint than the
speaker’s at speech time. We agree that this explanation is complex, but it is in
keeping with our intuition relative to the meaning effects produced by an utterance
like (36): the Speaker is not just making a simple conjecture but is adding a particular
component of meaning which to us seems captured by this notion of representation
of an allocentric consciousness. In other words, the Speaker communicates that
‘something similar to a future eventuality will prove me right’, and the fact that
this future is factually impossible and known as such is a different question entirely.
Thus what remains to be understood is the status of examples like (34) and (35),
which we marked as potentially odd. Unsurprisingly, we will, in fact, defend the
view according to which this oddness is, yet again, due to contextual, pragmatic
factors. However, before doing so we need to provide some details about these
pragmatic factors.
Our hypothesis relies on a more specific effect of the epistemic future. Not only
do future utterances imply an epistemic reading – through metarepresentations – of
an allocentric verification in a real or imaginary future, but their relevance is also
directly linked to the actual speech situation. More precisely, the epistemic future is
possible only in cases where the represented eventuality has a causal impact on a fact
currently relevant to the interlocutors, or an impact on the actions to be presently
undertaken in relation to the situation represented. We will develop this point in
our concluding remarks; but we already note that, for example (34), if the spherical
nature of the universe were relevant for the interlocutors at speech time, then the
epistemic reading would seem quite natural; it is the difficulty of imagining such
a context – again – which restricts this possibility and makes it apparently odd.
17 We notice, as mentioned in the introduction, that if epistemic futures were to be
understood as denoting truths in other possible worlds, then (34) and (35) should be
natural.
18 Personal communication.
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(35) is problematic because it is difficult to imagine a context where the utterance
could serve as an explanation for something. Yet one need only imagine a play,
staged in the afterlife, where certain beings are surprised not to witness the arrival,
in Hell, of a certain individual, a renowned sinner, thus making God’s indulgence
relevant and hence for (35) to appear normal. It is thus the contextual – pragmatic –
path, which widens out and shows what type of interpretation the epistemic future
imposes: not only the projection of an allocentric subject into the future, verifying
the fact, but also, and ultimately, the explanatory and causal nature of the fact for
the present situation. It now seems necessary to take a closer look at the hypothesis
that epistemic futures prompt the hearer to derive specific consequences from the
situation they evaluate in the present.
An explanatory value, introducing a causal relation between the mutually
manifest situation and the evaluated process – as well as a particular consequence in
relation to the situation of interlocution – seems to apply. Canonical examples such
as ce sera le facteur can be analysed thus: they explain the event (the doorbell ringing)
and posit a consequence by some inference, for instance, that the expected letter has
arrived, that there is no need to go to the door (if it was the neighbour’s doorbell),
that we can stay calm (if we are criminals fearing the arrival of the police) or some
other similar situation. In non-canonical cases, like son train traversera un tunnel or
elle prendra son bain, the explanatory parameter is present as well (for example this
may well be the reason why the person called is not reachable), and a consequence
in the present is also inferred (we have to be patient and try again later).
Yet a typical, spontaneous case, heard in a shoe shop in France, uttered by a
salesperson to a customer (one of this article’s authors) in search of a particular
brand, seems to contradict our hypothesis:19
(37) Elles seront sur ce pre´sentoir.
At first sight, there is no explanatory meaning in (37) concerning the present
situation, simply because ostensibly there is no proposition in the context identifying
a state of affairs to be explained.
Yet in considering competing forms, like (38):
(38) Je crois qu’elles sont sur ce pre´sentoir.
We notice that in (37) the Speaker is committed to his belief, in terms of which
he predicts that a verification would confirm this belief, and not merely a state of
affairs presented as modal. In the situation where (37) was uttered, the salesperson
spontaneously preceded the client to the stand in question in order to verify the
asserted probability, a situation which is not similarly expected in the case of (38)
(although, of course, it remains possible that the salesperson would decide to go
and check, but this is not an expectation the hearer will entertain on the basis of
linguistic parameters). Provisionally, we need to admit that an explanatory meaning
in epistemic future utterances in French arises only when there is a state of affairs
19 This utterance was heard in a shop in the small town of Langogne, in central France.
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calling for an explanation; in other cases such as (37), only a more fundamental
pragmatic effect of epistemic futures is triggered, to which we now turn.
4 concluding remarks : e p i stemic future s
as a deontic-practical modality?
Epistemic futures in French trigger quite complex metarepresentations. They
demand a particular enrichment, which is not a simple allocentric projection,
since it is not the state of affairs that is described in the future, but a belief
about a present state of affairs which is presented as being verifiable in the future,
combined with a consequence at the time of speech. This makes the epistemic
future resemble cases like the French imparfait of politeness ( J’avais une question), or
the counterfactual imparfait ( Une minute de plus et le train de´raillait), where a present
situation is envisioned in a different temporality, a different possible world, in order
to produce specific interpretive effects. For the epistemic future, these effects would
thus be linked not only to the epistemic nature of a belief that is uttered, but also
to a specific degree of speaker endorsement or commitment, which distinguishes
it from explicit modal formulations like I believe that P or Perhaps P, or even It is
likely that P.
It is sometimes assumed that the epistemic future in French has an evidential
meaning, the probable state of affairs being shown as inferred. Bellahse`ne (2007:
257), recalling previous work20 in this respect, insists that the French epistemic
future sets up an evidential relation of inference in a way similar to devoir. She
explains: ‘Cette relation d’infe´rence se fonde sur des faits observe´s dans le pre´sent
du locuteur‘ and ‘le locuteur prend connaissance d’une situation qui appelle une
explication.’
However, the idea that an evidential flavour of inference is present is somewhat
speculative, in the absence of anything that might motivate it (contrary to what
happens with devoir where the inference obviously relates to the necessity of the
conclusion, given the premises). As for the explanatory function of epistemic
futures, it seems to hold invariably only for the epistemic anterior future, as well as
those epistemic simple futures which address causal impact (such as (34–36) above).
Although some – possibly most – epistemic utterances with the simple future also
have an explanatory function, this is not the case in all situations. Clearly, the
utterance of (37) does not have any explanatory function in relation to the present
state of affairs: the customer’s request for a specific brand of shoes is in no way
explained by the shoes in question probably being on a particular stand.
We emphasized the fact that epistemic future utterances communicate
consequences for the present state of affairs. In fact, this might somehow seem
a trivial feature of oral communication. We would like, however, to turn our
attention to a thought which goes beyond the semantic-pragmatic framework,
therefore calling for further investigation. It seems to us that French epistemic
20 Dendale (2001) and Vet et Kampers-Manhe (2001).
220
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0959269511000445
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 18:49:48, subject to the Cambridge Core
A cognitive-pragmatic view of the French epistemic future
future usage occurs in typical situations where the epistemic future is interpreted as
giving rise to a deontic-practical conclusion, i.e. a conclusion about what should or
should not be done, for practical purposes. Thus, the fact that it is a future enables
one not only to communicate the ideas invoked in this article, but also to instruct
the hearer to infer the necessary action to be undertaken or attitude to adopt,
according to the new information introduced.21 It is at this level, we think, that the
difference is the most clearly apparent between Son train sera dans un tunnel, which
can typically be imagined in a context where the utterance prompts one to wait for
a better time to call again, and Je pense que son train est dans un tunnel, which gives
modal information of a factual type. The latter utterance is descriptive of the belief
itself, certainly allowing for a particular attitude or action, but not implicating it
outright. Inasmuch as the future tense relates to the future, it is not impossible that
one of the effects of the epistemic usage – having scope over a present situation, but
saying something about the future given the situation – is that the hearer derives
a deontic-practical conclusion in the future, relating to what it is necessary to do
or not do. It thus appears, if we are correct, that what makes such an utterance
relevant by comparison with more explicit modalities is not an evidential inferential
meaning but, rather, a prospective action or attitude to be adopted. That action
or attitude is to be undertaken in order to better adapt to a forthcoming situation
which is represented by the future tense utterance as being verified in the future by
an allocentric subject witnessing its occurrence.
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